The global distribution of Bacillus anthracis and associated anthrax risk to humans, livestock and wildlife. by Carlson, Colin J et al.
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
The global distribution of Bacillus anthracis and associated anthrax risk to humans, 
livestock and wildlife.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9rm1r8p8
Journal
Nature microbiology, 4(8)
ISSN
2058-5276
Authors
Carlson, Colin J
Kracalik, Ian T
Ross, Noam
et al.
Publication Date
2019-08-01
DOI
10.1038/s41564-019-0435-4
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Articles
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41564-019-0435-4
1National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, University of Maryland, Annapolis, MD, USA. 2Department of Biology, Georgetown University, 
Washington, Washington DC, USA. 3Spatial Epidemiology & Ecology Research Lab, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA. 
4Emerging Pathogens Institute, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA. 5EcoHealth Alliance, New York, NY, USA. 6Department of Fish and Wildlife 
Conservation, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA. 7School of the Coast and Environment, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA. 8AgriBio, 
Centre for Agribiosciences, Biosciences Research, Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia. 
9Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Government of the Northwest Territories, Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, Canada. 10Department 
of Large Animal Clinical Sciences, Western College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada. 11Parks 
Canada Agency, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada. 12Center for Disease Surveillance & Research, Institute of Disease Control and Prevention of PLA, 
Beijing, China. 13Scientific Research Veterinary Institute, Baku, Azerbaijan. 14Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of 
California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA. 15These authors contributed equally: Colin J. Carlson, Ian T. Kracalik. *e-mail: jkblackburn@ufl.edu
Anthrax is a zoonotic disease caused by the Gram-positive bacterium Bacillus anthracis, a generalist soil-transmitted pathogen found on every inhabited continent1, and several 
islands including Haiti and parts of the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Worldwide, an estimated 20,000 to 100,000 cases of anthrax occur 
annually, mostly in poor rural areas2. In clinical presentations 
of anthrax, case fatality rates are a function of exposure pathway. 
Respiratory exposure from spore inhalation is important in the con-
text of bioterrorism, but is highly uncommon, and accounts for a 
negligible fraction of the global burden of anthrax cases. Cutaneous 
exposure to B. anthracis accounts for the majority of human cases 
worldwide, and typically presents with low mortality; gastrointes-
tinal exposure accounts for the remainder and presents with inter-
mediate to high fatality rates. Cutaneous and gastrointestinal cases 
of anthrax are most commonly caused by handling and slaughter-
ing infected livestock, or butchering and eating contaminated meat; 
untreated gastrointestinal cases probably account for most human 
mortality from anthrax1–3.
Human mortality from anthrax is driven by ecological dynam-
ics at the wildlife–livestock interface4. In nature, the enzootic cycle 
of anthrax is characterized by a combination of long-term spore 
persistence in soil, and an obligate-lethal transmission route, 
primary in herbivorous mammals1,5,6. Both wild herbivores and 
livestock are gastrointestinally exposed to B. anthracis spores from 
soil while grazing, become infected, and usually return spores to 
the soil when they die and decompose7. As domesticated and wild 
herbivores frequently share grazing grounds, wildlife epizootics can 
lead to downstream infections in livestock and humans. In some 
regions, anthrax is hyperendemic, and cases follow regular seasonal 
trends; in other regions, the disease re-emerges in major epidemics 
after years or decades without a single case6. Environmental persis-
tence facilitates these unusual dynamics; under optimal conditions, 
B. anthracis spores are able to persist in the soil for long periods 
(that is, decades). Alkaline, calcium-rich soils are believed to facili-
tate sporulation, and therefore drive landscape-level patterns of 
persistence; these patterns are usually hypothesized to drive the dis-
tribution of B. anthracis up to the continental scale1,5.
Global variation in anthrax endemism and outbreak intensity 
has previously been characterized at extremely coarse scales8,9, but 
anthrax is a neglected disease, and its global distribution is still 
poorly characterized. In total, roughly a dozen studies have used 
ecological niche models to develop regional (usually national-level) 
maps of suitability for B. anthracis (see Supplementary Table  1). 
These regional mapping efforts are a critical part of the public health 
planning process10, but are primarily conducted in isolation, and the 
results of these studies have yet to be consolidated and synthesized. 
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Bacillus anthracis is a spore-forming, Gram-positive bacterium responsible for anthrax, an acute infection that most significantly 
affects grazing livestock and wild ungulates, but also poses a threat to human health. The geographic extent of B. anthracis is 
poorly understood, despite multi-decade research on anthrax epizootic and epidemic dynamics; many countries have limited 
or inadequate surveillance systems, even within known endemic regions. Here, we compile a global occurrence dataset of 
human, livestock and wildlife anthrax outbreaks. With these records, we use boosted regression trees to produce a map of 
the global distribution of B. anthracis as a proxy for anthrax risk. We estimate that 1.83 billion people (95% credible interval 
(CI): 0.59–4.16 billion) live within regions of anthrax risk, but most of that population faces little occupational exposure. More 
informatively, a global total of 63.8 million poor livestock keepers (95% CI: 17.5–168.6 million) and 1.1 billion livestock (95% CI: 
0.4–2.3 billion) live within vulnerable regions. Human and livestock vulnerability are both concentrated in rural rainfed systems 
throughout arid and temperate land across Eurasia, Africa and North America. We conclude by mapping where anthrax risk 
could disrupt sensitive conservation efforts for wild ungulates that coincide with anthrax-prone landscapes.
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Furthermore, cross-validation of regional models has only recently 
been attempted11, and indicates either limitations in model transfer-
ability, or possible genetic or ecological differences underlying dis-
tributional patterns of different regions; either way, this highlights 
the limitations preventing regional models from being scaled up to 
a global estimate. Moreover, the distribution of anthrax has yet to be 
modelled in several broad regions where it is nevertheless pervasive, 
especially Western Europe, the Middle East and South America. 
Cryptic persistence of B. anthracis spores in the soil makes mapping 
efforts especially challenging, as suitable and endemic regions could 
go years or potentially decades without a recorded outbreak.
This study consolidates clinical and ecological research on enzo-
otic and epidemic anthrax reports, compiling the largest global 
database of anthrax occurrences on record to map the global suit-
ability for B. anthracis persistence. A total of 5,108 records were 
compiled describing the global distribution of anthrax across 70 
countries (Fig.  1). Here we used a subset of 2,310 of these data 
points to describe the global distribution and eco-epidemiology 
of B. anthracis, exploring the relationship of anthrax outbreaks to 
environmental factors including soil characteristics and climate, via 
boosted regression trees (BRTs) as a tool for species distribution 
modelling. These maps provide a proxy for anthrax risk. We apply 
this global anthrax model to provide a first estimate of the global 
human and livestock populations at risk from anthrax. We compare 
the distribution of anthrax to that of critically threatened wildlife 
populations and identify areas where additional or new surveillance 
is needed to anticipate and prevent rare, but probably catastrophic, 
threats to wildlife conservation efforts.
Results
Our global ensemble distribution model (Fig.  2) performed very 
well on validation data (mean area under the curve (AUC) = 0.9244), 
and regionally matches the well-established distribution of anthrax 
in China12, Kazakhstan13, North America14 and Australia15, suggest-
ing that it appropriately captures the global range of B. anthracis. 
These four regions, along with a band of suitability in sub-Saharan 
Africa around roughly 15˚ S, represent the most geographically 
expansive zones of anthrax endemicity, and hotspots of human vul-
nerability. However, our study also shows that perhaps the majority 
of the European continent, and a substantial part of the Anatolian 
peninsula and surrounding region, are also highly suitable for B. 
anthracis. In some cases, high-risk areas match hyperendemic areas, 
such as Turkey and South Africa; but in other cases (for example, 
in Ethiopia), predicted areas of suitability were more limited than 
expected in countries with a high anthrax burden. This may reflect 
sampling limitations in these areas. For example, Ethiopia is signifi-
cantly under-represented, despite the high incidence of anthrax out-
breaks characterized by high morbidity and mortality16; this is at least 
partially attributable to the country’s limited surveillance capacity, 
overwhelmed by poverty and the high incidence (and co-morbidity) 
of other neglected tropical and zoonotic diseases17,18. However, dis-
crepancies between suitability and incidence also probably reflect 
regional variation in anthrax control. Where food safety practices 
prevent exposure and livestock vaccinations are affordable, high 
anthrax suitability may not translate into high case burdens (sup-
ported by the vaccination data in the Supplementary Information); 
conversely, anthrax morbidity and mortality are usually exacerbated 
by limited local knowledge about anthrax, limited access to health-
care and conflicting pressures such as food insecurity that force local 
populations to handle and eat contaminated meat.
Globally, we find that an estimated 1.8 billion people live within 
anthrax-suitable areas, the vast majority of whom live in rural areas 
in Africa, Europe and Asia (Table 1). However, most of that popu-
lation probably has no occupational exposure to infected animals, 
and direct exposure from the soil has rarely been reported for 
human cases; in those few reported cases patients had compromised 
immune systems and unknown or unusual exposure19. For a more 
informative perspective on risk, we estimate that a total of 63.8 mil-
lion rural poor livestock keepers live in anthrax-affected areas (95% 
credible interval (CI): 17.5–168.6 million; Table 1), again primar-
ily in Africa and Eurasia. Globally, we found that areas of anthrax 
risk contain 1.1 billion livestock (95% CI: 404 million–2.3 billion; 
Table 2), including 320 million sheep (95% CI: 138–622 million), 
294.9 million pigs (95% CI: 103–583 million), 268.1 million cattle 
(95% CI: 87.4–639 million), 211.2 million goats (95% CI: 74.8–
453 million) and 0.6 million buffalo (95% CI: 0.16–1.6 million). 
Although arid and semi-arid ecosystems were a significant source 
of vulnerable livestock across production systems (especially for 
cattle), the single most significant across all four groups was rainfed 
mixed crop/livestock systems in temperate-highland ecosystems, 
due to the disproportionate contribution from East Asia, especially 
China (Table 1).
Most livestock at risk of anthrax are unvaccinated in any given 
year (Fig. 3). As per reported data, an average of 212.8 million live 
attenuated vaccines for anthrax are manufactured every year (2005–
2016) outside the United States (which reports no data but is also a 
Outbreaks (2005–2016)
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Fig. 1 | Global distrubtion of outbreaks by country and geographic locations of anthrax events. Global database of anthrax occurrences (points) versus 
outbreaks of anthrax by country (January 2005–August 2016; data digitized from ref. 9). Black dots represent individual outbreak locations used in 
predictions.
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major manufacturer); on average, 198.2 million doses are used for 
livestock every year. Compared to the 1.1 billion livestock at risk, 
vaccine coverage is patchy and regionally variable; roughly 90% of 
cattle, sheep and goats are annually vaccinated in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, due to a strong legacy of mass vaccination cam-
paigns in the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, vaccination 
rates are alarmingly low in sub-Saharan Africa (0–6%), East Asia 
(0–5%) and South Asia (<1%), where more than half of the livestock 
at risk and 48.5 million rural poor livestock keepers are located. In 
these regions, livestock vaccination is commonly used reactively 
after a major outbreak, rather than as a preventative measure14,20; 
improving proactive vaccination in under-vaccinated, hyperen-
demic countries (in particular Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
South Africa, Turkey and Zimbabwe) could help bring anthrax out-
breaks under control10. Vaccination may also be less effective than 
usual for the 31 million livestock and 4.6 million poor livestock 
keepers in West Africa, where an endemic lineage of B. anthracis 
shares an anthrose-deficiency mutation that has been hypothesized 
to lead to a vaccine escape21. Education campaigns may be more 
cost-effective than mass vaccination, which is both cost-prohibitive 
and logistically challenging in inaccessible rural areas. However, 
livestock keepers may continue to sell contaminated meat to recoup 
financial losses (which also contributes to under-reporting); this 
has increased cases in urban settings22. In cases of extreme food 
insecurity, poor populations may eat anthrax-infected meat despite 
understanding the risks.
Although risk is most commonly measured at the human– 
agriculture interface, anthrax also has a major ecological impact; 
while B. anthracis is a stable part of some savannah ecosystems, epi-
zootics in other regions can have catastrophic impacts on wildlife 
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Fig. 2 | Global distribution of B. anthracis suitability (probability of occurrence). a–c, The estimate was modelled by an ensemble of 500 BRTs; lower 95% 
confidence bound (a), mean of all 500 models (b) and upper 95% confidence bound (c).
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populations1,23. We note that several ungulate species could proba-
bly benefit from improved epizootic surveillance, given range over-
lap with anthrax and limited coverage by protected areas, which are 
a foundation of anthrax surveillance and control for most wildlife 
(Table 3)24. Saiga antelope (Saiga tatarica) in particular have a sig-
nificant overlap with anthrax outside protected parts of their range, 
and the recent mass die-off of a third of the entire population of 
saiga in three weeks highlights the vulnerability of threatened ungu-
lates to sudden, disease-induced population crashes. The anthrax 
vaccine may be used by conservationists in special cases (for exam-
ple, with cheetahs and rhinoceros25), but the lack of an oral anthrax 
vaccine makes mass vaccination more impractical for wildlife than 
for livestock, making surveillance all the more important.
Discussion
Our study has produced a global map of B. anthracis suitability as a 
proxy for anthrax risk, and while this is a major step forward, sev-
eral important directions remain to make these models actionable 
for public health practitioners. Although some estimates have been 
proposed for the annual global burden of anthrax, these estimates 
range by several orders of magnitude. Most regional assessments, 
especially in rural Africa, agree that anthrax cases are severely 
under-reported despite mandatory reporting. Similar studies to 
ours have used suitability maps to extrapolate global case burden 
for diseases such as dengue fever or melioidosis (Burkholderia pseu-
domallei)26,27; however, this approach seems inadequate for anthrax, 
given that human incidence is just as strongly determined by anthrax 
dynamics in wildlife, local agricultural intensity, knowledge about 
anthrax transmission, access to healthcare and vaccination, and 
complicating factors such as food insecurity. At national and local 
levels, One Health approaches to surveillance have had promising 
results, but a more globally coordinated network among these pro-
grammes might help address some of the major data gaps.
Regional-scale modelling will also help advance modelling work 
that explicitly predicts seasonal dynamics of anthrax risk. Across 
countries and continents, anthrax dynamics are often seasonal, 
although this may range from predictable annual outbreaks to spo-
radic, high-mortality epizootics12,23,28–31. The timing and intensity of 
seasonality are far from consistent across space, even on the same 
continent1,5, and the underlying drivers are a complex product of 
local climate and soil conditions, herbivore community structure and 
seasonal movement dynamics, and co-morbidity with other patho-
gens23,32–34. Several recently advanced spatiotemporal modelling 
methods can capture and infer complex seasonal drivers of zoonotic 
spillover35,36, but in application to anthrax, these models would be 
most appropriate at spatial scales where these drivers are consistent 
across the landscape37. Advancing these types of model may help iden-
tify spatial patterns of risk that are missing in a static, global map of 
suitability (including places epizootics may be possible despite a lack 
of long-term suitability for anthrax establishment), and will also fur-
ther connect public health work to enzootic versus epizootic dynam-
ics in wildlife. Our work—and future models incorporating more 
temporally dynamic environmental predictors of anthrax risk—also 
set a foundation for investigating how climate and land cover change 
will impact the distribution and burden of anthrax. Published work 
suggests that anthrax suitability may decrease in parts of Kazakhstan 
and the southern United States in a changing climate, but other work 
anticipates warming-driven emergence at higher latitudes38,39. Our 
study includes recent records from the Yamalo-Nenets area of Russia, 
where outbreaks in reindeer have led to massive economic losses and 
threaten the livelihood of traditional pastoralists. However, our model 
made limited predictions of suitability in the sub-Arctic in current 
Table 1 | Population at risk (in millions) by region, land use and occupational exposure
Region Poor livestock keepers Rural Peri-urban urban Total
East Asia and the Pacific 5.7 458.5 15.0 162.4 635.9
South Asia 26.6 345.0 1.9 55.1 401.9
Western and Central Europe 0.26 125.3 14.0 79.6 218.8
North Africa and the Middle East 6.6 152.9 6.1 51.7 210.7
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 5.6 112.7 3.4 26.5 142.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.2 84.2 1.5 16.6 102.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.9 38.1 2.6 42.0 82.7
North America <0.1 5.6 3.6 21.5 30.8
Australia and Oceania <0.1 0.74 0.24 0.7 1.76
World total 63.8 1,323.1 48.4 456.1 1,827.5
Table 2 | Estimated global livestock at risk (in millions), by species and region
Region Cattle Pigs Goats Sheep Buffalo Total
East Asia and the Pacific 63.2 190.9 79.9 108.1 0.24 442.4
South Asia 61.6 1.8 72.5 18.7 0.33 154.8
Western and Central Europe 22.2 60.9 7.5 42.2 <0.1 132.8
North Africa and the Middle East 15.8 0.2 13.4 65.2 <0.1 94.6
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 26.6 12.0 8.9 40.4 <0.1 87.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 30.5 5.3 22.4 14.5 0 72.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 21.9 8.0 5.7 8.1 0 43.7
North America 23.0 15.2 0.45 0.29 0 39.0
Australia and Oceania 3.1 0.61 0.47 22.7 0 26.9
World total 268.1 294.9 211.2 320.1 0.58 1,094.9
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climates. Even though anthrax cases are regularly reported through-
out Sweden, northern Russia and other cold, high-latitude countries, 
high-latitude outbreaks are proportionally under-represented in our 
database (and are often poorly documented). Persistence at higher 
latitudes may also be better predicted by a slightly different set of cli-
matic constraints on persistence. A recently published model trained 
on high-latitude cases in the Northern Hemisphere seems to under-
predict known areas of endemism in warmer climates, possibly sup-
porting this explanation39. Feedback between local modelling efforts 
and updated global consensus mapping will improve our overall 
understanding of what drives different anthrax dynamics, and the 
likely impact of climate change.
Finally, we observe increasing interest, by microbiologists and 
ecologists alike, in the closely related ‘anthrax-like’ Bacillus cereus 
biovar. anthracis (Bcbva). Whereas B. cereus is a typically non-
pathogenic soil bacterium, the pathogenic Bcbva carries variants of 
the pXO1 and pXO2 plasmids that allow capsule production, which 
are both required for full virulence in B. anthracis. A recent study 
in Taï National Park in Cote D’Ivôire showed that Bcbva accounted 
for 40% of wildlife mortality in a 26-year survey, and could poten-
tially drive the local extinction of chimpanzees in the Taï Forest 
within the next century40. The geographic distribution of Bcbva is 
still unknown, and it is plausible that different climatic and envi-
ronmental factors determine the spatial patterns of its transmission; 
however, improved diagnostics will be necessary to differentiate the 
role of the two pathogens in anthrax infections beyond Taï National 
Park. Mapping Bcbva across West Africa may be an important next 
step for measuring the threat of anthrax and anthrax-like disease 
to wildlife conservation (and, potentially, to human health in the 
future).
Methods
Occurrence and pseudoabsence data. We assembled a global occurrence database 
for B. anthracis out of a combination of outbreak data collected in the field by the 
authors or their extended team of collaborators, national passive surveillance and 
reporting infrastructures, online records from ProMed Mail, and georeferenced 
records or digitized maps from peer-reviewed publications documenting anthrax 
outbreaks. Our final database of 5,018 unique records spanning 70 countries 
and more than a century (1914–2018) thinned to 2,310 distinct localities after 
removing uncertain sightings and thinning to a single point per unique 10 arcmin 
(~20 km at the Equator) cell, to correct for sampling bias41. For background 
environmental data, a total dataset of 10,000 pseudoabsences were randomly 
generated from countries where anthrax occurrence records were collected, an 
upper sample commonly used for similar disease distribution mapping studies42. 
Of these 10,000, an equal 1:1 sample was randomly selected to match the presence 
points in submodels, as is recommended for BRT models43.
Environmental predictors. Global layers of environmental predictors were 
selected on the basis of successful variables used in previously published anthrax 
distribution modelling studies at regional scales13–15, as well as from other 
distribution modelling studies on soil-borne pathogens27. Climate data were taken 
from version 1.4 of the WorldClim dataset, which includes 19 bioclimatic variables 
characterizing average and seasonal trends in temperature and precipitation44. 
Livestock vaccination
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Fig. 3 | Map of average anthrax vaccination rates per country for all livestock species. Average vaccination rates for all livestock (cattle, sheep, goats, 
buffalo and pigs) reported to the World Animal Health Information System over the interval 2005–2016, as a function of doses administered and reported 
livestock populations at risk, excluding years with no reported vaccination.
Table 3 | overlap between selected wildlife species of concern 
and the global distribution of anthrax, including overlap with 
the protected areas database
Wildlife species Geographic 
overlap
Anthrax-suitable-
area overlap with 
protected areas
IuCN Red 
list status
Bison (B. bison) 32.2% 64.6% NT
Pronghorn  
(A. americana)
26.6% 3.9% LC
Roan (H. equinus) 23.9% 30.5% LC
Saiga (S. tatarica) 17.5% 2.8% CE (A2acd)
Moose (A. alces) 6.0% 9.9% LC
Reindeer (R. tarandus) 1.6% 14.9% LC
Yak (B. mutus) 0.7% 0% VU (C10)
IUCN abbreviations: LC, least concern; NT, near threatened; VU, vulnerable; CE, critically 
endangered; additional information gives reference codes for endangered designation within 
sections of the IUCN Red List.
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In addition to climate data, we included layers describing elevation, soil and two 
vegetation indices. Elevational data were taken from the Global Multi-resolution 
Terrain Elevation Data (GMTED2010) dataset provided by the US Geological 
Service. Soil layers were taken from the Global Soil Information Facilities SoilGrids 
database at 250 m resolution; four layers were included: soil pH, and the predicted 
soil content of sand, humult and calcic vertisols at a depth of 0–5 cm45. The mean 
and amplitude of the normalized difference vegetation index were taken from the 
Trypanosomiasis and Land Use in Africa (TALA) dataset46. To prevent overfitting 
and reduce correlation among predictor variables, the variable set was reduced 
down using an automated procedure within the BRT implementation.
Distribution modelling. BRTs are currently considered a best practices method 
for modelling the global distribution of infectious diseases26,47, including other 
soil-transmitted pathogens such as B. pseudomallei27. In our study, BRTs were 
implemented using the ‘gbm’ package in R to develop a global species distribution 
model for B. anthracis. Automated variable set reduction procedures selected a total 
of 17 predictor layers: 10 bioclimatic variables, 2 vegetation indices, elevation and 
4 soil variables. Presence, absence and environmental data were run through the 
‘gbm.step’ procedure on default settings (tree complexity = 4, learning rate = 0.005), 
following the established template of other studies. A total of 500 submodels 
were run; for each, presence points were bootstrapped, and pseudoabsences were 
randomly selected from the total 10,000 to achieve a 1:1 ratio43. Separate from the 
internal cross-validation (75%–25% split) of the BRT procedure, both presence 
and pseudoabsence points were split into an 80% training and 20% test dataset in 
each submodel, and model AUC was evaluated on the basis of the independent test 
dataset. A final average model was calculated across the 500 submodels, and the 5th 
and 95th percentiles were retained for use in the population at risk analyses. Models 
performed very well on the withheld test data (mean submodel AUC = 0.9244).
Estimation of human and livestock populations at risk. We estimated the 
vulnerability of human and livestock populations by overlaying population datasets 
with maps of anthrax-suitable areas28. We mapped global anthrax suitability by 
dichotomizing model predictions with a threshold of 0.565 for suitable versus 
unsuitable predictions, with the threshold selected to maximize the true skill 
statistic (which weights sensitivity and specificity equally) of mean predictions 
across the entire dataset of all sightings and pseudoabsences. We estimated global 
population at risk using human population counts for 2015 from the Gridded 
Population of the World dataset, version 4.0. We dichotomized ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ 
areas using the Global Human Built-up and Settlement Extent dataset, version 
1.0. We further split ‘urban’ areas into urban and peri-urban on the basis of the 
Gridded Population of the World dataset, where we used a density under 1,000 
people per square kilometre as the threshold for classification as peri-urban.  
To measure possible occupational exposure, we used a global dataset of rural  
poor livestock keeper density48. Finally, we estimated the number of livestock 
(cattle, sheep, goats and swine) using a database of global livestock density at a 
spatial resolution of ~1 km × 1 km (https://livestock.geo-wiki.org/home-2/)49.  
Those livestock populations at risk were further stratified by each of the 
livestock production zones using the livestock production systems data version 
5 (https://livestock.geo-wiki.org/home-2/)48–50. For all human and livestock 
analyses, we obtained vulnerability estimates by overlaying population counts 
with dichotomized anthrax-suitable areas from the BRT models; 95% credibility 
intervals were calculated by using the 5% (lower) and 95% (upper) bounds of the 
averaged BRT model prediction, in place of the mean prediction28.
Delineating wildlife at risk. We evaluated overlap between range maps of every 
extant ungulate with International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
conservation status (Artiodactyla and Perissodactyla; after reducing from all 
mammals in IUCN—see Supplementary Information). We identified ungulate 
species of interest on the basis of species of conservation concern with known 
range overlap with anthrax, and measured the degree of range overlap with our 
global B. anthracis model, as a proxy for anthrax exposure. We selected seven 
candidate species of interest for the main analysis: pronghorn (Antilocapra 
americana), roan (Hippotragus equinus), saiga (S. tatarica), moose (Alces alces), 
reindeer (Rangifer tarandus), wild yak (Bos mutus) and bison (Bison bison). Of the 
seven, saiga are most threatened, and are listed on the IUCN Red List as critically 
endangered. Yak are listed as vulnerable; bison are listed as near threatened; and 
pronghorn, roan and moose are listed as least concern. We use the World Database 
on Protected Areas and official IUCN range maps, although we note that these 
range maps tend to overestimate ranges and can be misleading for conservation 
work51. (At least for saiga, we note that telemetry studies are currently underway to 
reassess the boundaries of the species’ range.)
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the 
Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the 
corresponding author upon reasonable request and approval from appropriate 
partner country ministries of health or agriculture.
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